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1   Introduction and motivation 
It is now well established that an individual’s norms, tastes and beliefs are, to a large 
extent, determined during his young formative years. Following Bisin and Verdier (2000, 
2001a), these norms and values are labeled here as ‘culture
1’ and the transmission of the 
norms across generations as ‘cultural transmission’. The experiences and impressions 
during childhood and adolescence have a lasting effect on behaviour via two parallel 
processes: (i) social interactions across generations within the family, and (ii) within 
generations by the local cultural and social environment (e.g. schools, religious 
organizations, or neighborhood composition). These two venues are referred to as 'direct 
vertical socialization' versus 'oblique socialization' (terminology used by Cavalli-Sforza 
and Feldman, 1981). 
 
This paper relates to one specific component of ‘culture’, namely ‘religiosity’, which is 
expressed by religious norms, beliefs and behavior. The process of intergenerational 
transmission of ‘religiosity’ will be described by the (i) diffusion of religious beliefs that 
affect religious practice (evidenced by attendance of church services
2 and private prayer); 
and (ii) passing on the religious 'taste for children' that determines fertility among the 
‘religious’ sub-population, and consequently, the religious make-up of the population. 
These two elements are the focus of this study.  
 
The great majority of studies on this topic (reviewed in the next section) are empirical. 
They are quite narrow in the sense that they do not provide a systematic full description 
of the religious transmission process, fertility decisions and the resulting changes in the 
religious/secular composition of the population. This paper aims at filling this gap by 
presenting a systematic theoretical model of the cultural transmission of religious norms 
and beliefs and their effect on reproductive behavior, and consequently, on 
                                                 
1 The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines culture as: “a:  the integrated pattern of human knowledge, 
belief, and behavior that depends upon man’s capacity for learning and transmitting knowledge to 
succeeding generation; b: the customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits of a racial, religious or 
social group, also: the characteristic features of everyday existence (as diversions or a way of life) shared 
by people in a place or time.” 
2 The term 'church' is a generic term for the place of religious worship (synagogue, in the Jewish religion; 
mosque, in the Moslem faith, etc.)   3
secularization
3. It is an evolutionary dynamic model that is constructed on the 
foundations of Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001a). Hypotheses will be derived based on the 
theoretical model and simulations. Data from 32 countries, collected within the 
framework of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP): Religion II (1998), will 
then be used to support the theory and simulations with empirical evidence. The ISSP is 
an ongoing endeavour devoted to cross-country research on national attitudes. The data 
covers the European and Australian continents and North America
4. The African 
continent is excluded and South America and Asia are represented by a small number of 
countries (Chile, Japan, Israel and the Philippines). The research is therefore pertaining to 
Europe, North-America and Australia, and a few other countries. The ISSP includes 
questions on attitudes, beliefs and opinions on various issues, as well as numerous 
questions regarding individuals' socio-economic and religious behaviours. It includes also 
retrospective data on ‘religiosity’ of the previous generation: (i) the religious 
denomination of the respondent when he was a child, as well as his father’s and mother’s; 
and (ii) the frequency of maternal and paternal church attendance, as well as the 
respondent's church participation when he was 12 years old. These variables are crucial 
for the analysis of the intergenerational transmission of ‘religiosity’. Information on the 
religious denomination of the spouse is also included. 
 
The next section presents a literature overview. Section 3 presents the theoretical model, 
followed by simulations that detect the dynamic changes in the religious make-up (shares 
of secular/religious) caused by changes in the model's core parameters. Corollaries 
derived from the model and simulations are also presented. The fifth section presents 
                                                 
3 The concept ‘secularization’ has been used in the literature to refer to diverse aspects such as: (i) 
differentiation of the major institutions of society (law, politics, economy, education, etc.) from the 
influence of religion; (ii) rationalization (Weber, 1930); (iii) demystification of all spheres of life; (iv) less 
adherence to religious acts such as attendance of religious services and prayer. We refer only to this last 
sub-part of the term ’secularization’. Sommerville (1998) sorted out the different aspects of secularization 
and divided them into two categories: (i) those presented in terms of processes (like decline, differentiation, 
disengagement, rationalization); or (ii) in terms of aspects of life or levels of analyses (structural, cultural, 
organizational, individual). We refer to ‘secularization’ as a decline in individual religious practice. 
Tschannen (1991) provides an inventory of the elements of classic theories of secularization. See also 
Swatos and Christiano (1999) for a comprehensive review of the secularization theory and debate. 
4 An interesting point relating to this is that historically, secularization finds its roots in the enlightenment 
movement of the 17
th and 18
th century in the predominantly Christian Europe and North America.  4
empirical evidence that lends support to the conclusions of the theoretical model and 
simulations. The last section summarizes and concludes.  
 
2   Literature overview 
Cultural transmission has been studied by several disciplines of the social sciences: e.g. 
anthropology, sociology, social psychology, as well as evolutionary biology. Early 
studies on cultural transmission include, among many others: Cavalli-Sforza and 
Feldman, (1973, 1981); Hoge et al., (1982); Boyd and Richerson, (1985). Recently, 
economists have also realized that systematic variation in culture and religion matters to 
important economic phenomena, such as: educational attainments (Mulligan, 1999; 
Landes, 2000; Black et al., 2005; Fan, 2008); labor force participation (Fernandez and 
Fogli, 2009); occupation (Long and Ferrie, 2005); income (Solon, 1992; Mulligan, 1997); 
marriage and inter-faith marriage (Bisin et al., 2004); fertility (Blau, 1992; Fernandez and 
Fogli, 2006, 2009; Neuman, 2007; Brañas-Garza and Neuman, 2007); as well as attitudes 
which affect the labor market and other economic and social performance, such as 
attitudes of trust and risk (Dohmen et al., 2006) and attitudes of cooperation (Cipriani et 
al., 2007). It follows that variations in culture may be responsible for observed 
differences in socio-economic outcomes and should therefore be incorporated into the 
analysis of intermarriage, fertility, labor market behavior, educational attainments, 
secularization, etc.  
 
Our paper focuses on religious behaviour (secularization) that evolves from 
intergenerational religious transmission. The process of religious transmission includes 
the (i) diffusion of religious beliefs; and (ii) passing on the religious 'taste for children' 
that determines fertility. These two elements are central in this study. (i) Azzi and 
Ehrenberg (1975), Neuman (1986) and Iannaccone (1990) suggested to follow the human 
capital approach to study the accumulation of an individual's 'religious capital'
5. The 
accumulation of an individual's 'religious capital' starts at childhood when the parents 
pass on religious knowledge and attitudes to their children, and when the child is exposed 
                                                 
5 'Religious capital' is a variant of the broader concept of 'human capital'. de la Croix and Michel (2002) 
relate to human capital accumulation models in which social norms are transmitted from one generation to 
the next one.   5
to religious practice at school, at church and at the neighbourhood he lives in. A positive 
empirical relationship between the intensity of exposure to religious conduct during 
childhood and the individual's current religiosity has been documented in the literature 
(e.g., Hoge et al., 1982; Clark and Worthington, 1987; Cornwall, 1988; Ozorak, 1989; 
Erickson, 1992; Thomson et al., 1992; Hayes and Pittelkow, 1993; Brañas-Garza and 
Neuman, 2006). Sherkat and Wilson (1995) used the concept 'adaptive preferences' and 
claimed that socialization through childhood religious practice creates preferences upon 
which later religious choices will be made. Shy (2007), who presented a dynamic 
theoretical model of religious conformity and conversion, claimed that religious 
education by the parents and by the church enhances religious conformity. It follows that 
more exposure to childhood religious socialization will decrease the likelihood of 
secularization later on in life. Gender differences in the religious transmission process 
have also been recognized (e.g., Beit-Hallahmi, 1997; Brañas-Garza and Neuman, 2004). 
 
Parents have a technology for transmitting religious values to their children. Families that 
are more homogeneous with respect to their religious beliefs are endowed with a more 
productive technology to socialize children to such beliefs. The same effort exerted by 
the parent will therefore yield better results in homogamous same-faith families. 
Moreover, parents are not only actively instilling children with preferences and beliefs 
similar to their own; they are also serving as role-models their children imitate. A 
homogamous family in which the two role-models behave by similar rules and beliefs 
facilitates an easier and more efficient imitation process. In the same vein, if the founding 
couple do not share the same faith, they are less likely to pass on a religious legacy due to 
disagreement about religious rules. In fact, intermarriage signals that religion has lost its 
prime value and importance
6. 
 
                                                 
6 Obviously, this is only one explanation for the higher ‘value’ of religiously homogamous families, an 
explanation that emphasizes the link between marriage choices and the socialization of children to their 
parents’ religious beliefs and norms. As a consequence, individuals are willing to exert effort to segregate 
into a restricted marriage pool in which they are more likely to meet prospective spouses of the same 
religious faith. Marriage choices are therefore motivated (also) by the desire to socialize children and will 
result in assortative marriage pairs along religious lines. There might be positive assortative mating also 
along lines of other attitudes and beliefs. Dohmen et al. (2006) investigated whether there was evidence for 
assortative mating based on risk and trust attitudes and did not find such evidence.   6
Diffusion of religious norms and behavior is affected by parental religious inputs via 
‘direct vertical socialization’, but also via ‘oblique socialization’ by the religious 
environment. A closely related topic is the relationship between the religious pluralism 
(diversity) and religiosity (adherence) of the population. 
The literature offers two conflicting ‘theories’ and presents opposite empirical results. 
The long-standing ‘demand-side’ views (also referred to as the 'secularization 
hypothesis', presented mainly by sociologists) expect more  secularization in more 
religiously pluralistic states. At the other end, the ‘supply-side’ or ‘market theory’ 
(presented by economists) predicts less secularization (more religious adherence) in 
countries that are more religiously-diverse 
7.  
 
The  demand-side theory claims that in countries with a diversity of religious 
denominations, individuals are exposed to a variety of religion products and this might 
weaken their ties with the religion they were raised in (e.g. Kelley, 1977; Sherkat, 1991, 
among many others). The process of disaffiliation is magnified by intermarriage. If there 
is a dominant denomination, a high proportion of marital unions will bring together two 
people with the same religious affiliation. On the other hand, in a multi-religion country 
there are higher prospects of intermarriage. Intermarriage reduces the probability of 
religious affiliation for the offspring and increases the likelihood of disaffiliation for the 
spouses (Voas, 2003). 
 
The supply-side approach treats churches as firms producing a mix of valuable products 
(e.g. Iannaccone, 1991). If religious markets function like other markets, then a greater 
diversity of religions available in a country is said to promote greater competition, and 
hence, a higher quality religion product. Religiously pluralistic markets would stimulate 
churches to produce religious services well adapted to the needs of religious consumers, 
                                                 
7 Following our theoretical model we focus on the effect of religious diversity (pluralism) on secularization. 
The extensive literature on the 'demand side' and 'supply side' theories of religiosity is much broader and 
looks at the relationship between religiosity and a battery of potential explanatory variables, such as: 
economic development, urbanization (McCleary and Barro, 2006), the existence of a state religion (Barro 
and McCleary, 2005), and public spending (Gill and Lundsgaarde, 2004; Franck and Iannaccone, 2009; 
Hungerman, 2009).  7
thereby increasing ‘religious consumption’ (e.g. church attendance) (examples of such 
studies that also presented evidence on the suggested positive relationship include: Finke 
and Stark 1988, 1989; Iannaccone, 1991; Finke, 1992). An often cited example for the 
positive relationship between religious pluralism and religiosity is the case of the United 
States, which among the industrialized nations, has both the highest levels of religious 
pluralism and one of the highest rates of church attendance (e.g. Warner, 1993). Thus, 
according to the ‘religious market theory’, more religious diversity stimulates greater 
religious participation (less secularization). Breault (1989a, 1989b) and Olsen (1999) 
loudly criticized the ‘religious market theory’, and in particular the findings of Finke and 
Stark (1988) who claimed a positive link between pluralism and participation in the US. 
They ‘reassessed’ the findings for the US and arrived at a negative relationship. 
It might well be the case that demand and supply forces are both at work simultaneously 
and the final outcome is determined by the more dominant force. Moreover, could be that 
up to some level of religious pluralism, demand forces dominate and dictate a negative 
relationship between religious diversity and religious practice, whereas from that point 
onwards supply effects take over, leading to a positive association between religious 
diversity and religious performance.  
 
(ii) The process of transmitting the 'taste for children' is less obvious and probably more 
complex. Since economists typically assume that preferences are stable and beyond the 
scope of their analysis, it is not surprising that relatively little work has been done by 
economists on the cultural transmission of preferences for children (which affect fertility 
and differ along the lines of ethnicity, social class, religion, etc.). In several studies 
examining immigrants' fertility patterns it has been shown that country of origin matters 
(Blau, 1992; Guinnane et al., 2006; Fernandez and Fogli, 2009; Booth and Kee, 2009). It 
has been argued that different countries possess different values and norms regarding the 
appropriate roles for women in society, and what is the ideal family size. These 
preferences and beliefs are transmitted by the parents during childhood, and hence, where 
a woman’s parents were born matters even if the examined women had left their country 
of origin and now share the same economic incentives, markets and institutions. Murphy 
and Kundsen (2002), Booth and Kee (2009) and Fernandez and Fogli (2006), addressed  8
also the effect of the number of siblings in the family of origin on fertility. They found 
positive significant effects for Sweden, Britain and the US.  
 
How does religiosity in the country of origin and in the family where the woman grew up 
affect her taste for children and consecutively her fertility?
8 The economics literature 
does not provide a clear-cut answer to this question. However, it has often been claimed 
that there is a positive relationship between fertility and current religiosity. Research on 
the relationship between current religiosity and fertility is mainly empirical and has taken 
two directions: one examined differences in fertility between religions that coexist in the 
same country (e.g., Lehrer, 1996; Morgan et al., 2002; Borooah, 2004; Schellekens and 
van Poppel, 2006); and a second, more limited line, linked differences in fertility within a 
given religion to the individual’s intensity  of religious practice (e.g., Mosher and 
Hendershot, 1984; Neuman and Ziderman, 1986; Sander, 1992; Amin et al., 1997; 
Brañas-Garza and Neuman, 2007). These two lines are intertwined – intensive religious 
practice will influence fertility only if the religion has a pro-natalist ideology. The natural 
explanation for the positive relationship between religiosity and fertility was that pro-
natalist religions have an integral built-in preference for children (both directly and also 
indirectly via the illegal use of contraceptives and abortion). It follows that more religious 
parents have more children. If we combine this result with the findings cited above 
regarding the positive relationship between fertility and the number of siblings in the 
family of origin, we can speculate that the 'taste for children' is passed on from mother to 
daughter, and daughters of more religious mothers (who have more siblings) will also 
have more children. However, in empirical studies that examined Spanish and Italian 
Catholic women, it was found that daughters of ultra religious mothers (who participated 
in church services at least once a week and most probably had preferences for large 
families) had less children (by about 0.7 children) compared to women who were raised 
by less religious mothers (Neuman, 2007; Brañas-Garza and Neuman, 2007). It therefore 
                                                 
8 Obviously, a woman’s fertility is affected by a large number of other factors as well. Economists focus 
especially on investments in human capital, and on wealth and income that result from human capital 
accumulation (Becker, 1960; Becker and Lewis, 1973; Becker and Tomes, 1976; Becker and Barro, 1988; 
Becker et al., 1990; Hanushek, 1992; and Ermisch, 2003). These factors have to be controlled when the 
effect of religious transmission is examined. Recently economists also referred to non-economic motives, 
such as social aspirations (Tournemaine, 2008) 
  9
appears that the process of intergenerational transmission of the 'taste for children' is 
more complex and not necessarily positively monotonic.  
 
3   The theoretical model: Intergenerational transmission of religious norms and the 
evolutionary process of secularization  
To describe the dynamics of the secular/religious ratio within a country’s population, we 
utilize Bisin and Verdier's (2001a) framework to portray cultural transmission of 
religious norms and its effect on fertility patterns, and consequently on the religious 
make-up (i.e. the shares of religious/secular residents) of the next generation.   
 
Consider a society that consists of two types of sub-populations: religious  r , and 
secular  s
9. In the empirical section that follows we will define ‘secular’ and ‘religious’ 
in terms of frequency of church attendance and frequency of prayer habits
10.  
The individuals in this society operate in a two period overlapping generation world: each 
individual belongs to a family where she/he is a child in her first period, and may become 
a parent in her/his second period t, in which she is economically active. Each family has 
one parent who is the decision maker of the household. At the outset of the second period 
each individual of type i,    , ir s   gives birth to 
i
t n  offspring. Therefore, each family of 
type i,   , ir s  , consists of a parent and 
i
t n  children.  A parent of type i, living at time t, 
derives utility from the number of children,
i
t n , as well as from their type 
(religious/secular). The utility associated with children is defined by  
ii i
t k f n  where 
i k  
is the 'taste for children' of parents of type i. In addition we assume that the marginal 
                                                 
9Defining secular is normally done relative to some definition of religious. As Bailey (1998) puts it: 
"Secular is really quite easy to define! Its meaning keeps changing yet remains consistent. It is always 
means, simply, the opposite of "religious" – whatever that means" (1998: 18).  
10 Obviously, there are alternative measures for the identification of secular/religious individuals. For 
instance, measures that examine beliefs (in: God, afterlife, miracles, etc.). The advantage of the church 
attendance measure is that it is quantifiable and objective. We also experimented with another quantitative 
measure that related to prayer (“how many times a day do you pray?” ranging from ‘never’ (category 1) to 
‘several times a day (category 11)). The empirical results based on each of these two types of religious 
practice were very similar.   10
utility from the number of children is positive and diminishing, that 
is,  0, 0
ii ff     and
     




    . It is also assumed that 
 00 f 
11.  Judaism, Christianity and Islam all advocate high fertility and limit the use 
of birth control measures and abortions, it is therefore assumed that a religious parent has 
a stronger ‘taste for children’ than a secular one, i.e., 
rs kk  meaning that ceteris paribus 
religious individuals will have more children
12.   
  
All children are born without defined preferences or cultural/religious traits and are first 
exposed to their parent’s traits. We assume that each parent has a strong preference for 
having children who share his own traits. Motivated by this form of paternalistic altruism 
(or 'imperfect empathy'), a parent always attempts to socialize her children to her own 
preference traits (Bisin and Verdier, 2001a, 2001b; Bisin et al., 2004).  We denote the 
utility derived by a parent of type i from a child which inherited her level of religiosity 
by 
ii V  and the utility which a parent of type i derives from a child who did not inherit 
her type of religiosity by 
ij V , where  0
ii ij VV  . The difference 
ii i i j VVV   
represents the 'relative intolerance' defined as the perceived utility gains that a parent of 
religious group i derives from offspring of religion level i rather than  j  (Bisin et al., 
2004: 618).  A parent can affect her children's traits by socializing them to her own 
values. A successful socialization process is driven by two factors: the parent's 'direct 
socialization effort' and the neighborhood or 'oblique effect'. The direct parental effort has 
a success probability of 
i
t d  (01
i
t d  ). If a child was not successfully socialized by her 
parent, which occurs with probability (1
i
t d  ), she will pick up a trait randomly via the 
neighborhood effect (oblique socialization)
13. The trait i will be picked-up with 
                                                 
11 We differ from Bisin and Verdier (2001a) by assuming, in line with Becker's seminal contributions, that 
individuals derive utility from raising offspring.   
12 Religious people are obligated to follow the command: "Be fruitful and increase in number; fill the earth 
and subdue it."  (Genesis 1:28).   
13 Note that in this model we are not considering the individual's choices of location. Although, in many 
cases, different sectors segregate themselves by creating closed communities thus preventing their offspring 
from encounters with other sectors that could result in socialization to the different sector. It is assumed 
therefore that 
i
t q  is exogenous at each period, i.e., the parent does not choose a neighborhood with an 
optimal religious mix of residents. On choice of locations, see Buchanan and Faith (1987) and Alesina and  11
probability
i
t q  (where 
i
t q  is the fraction of individuals with trait i), and a trait j i   will be 
picked-up with probability (1
i
t q  ).  It is further assumed that the probability of a child to 
be socialized into a specific trait is independent of her siblings' traits.  By the law of large 
numbers, the expected utility that a parent of type i has from a child's type/religiosity at 
time t is: 
 
(1)           11 1 ( 1 )
tt t
i i i i ii i i ij i i i i ij
tt t t t t E Vd d q V d q V d d q V V            . 
 
The utility associated with the offspring's type/religiosity is linear in the number of 
children and is:  ()
ii
tt nEV .  
Raising children implies costs. The cost of raising 
i
t n  children, by a parent with trait i, is 
denoted by   
ii
t n   and assumed to be linear in the number of children, i.e.,:   
       0, 0, 0 0, 0 0
ii ii i i
tt nn         
14. It is also assumed that   
ii
t n   and 
 
ii
t n   are continuous functions for  0 n  .  
 
Direct parental socialization is also costly. It is assumed that parents with trait i devote to 
each of their children the same direct socialization effort. The cost of direct socialization 





where:        0, 0, 0 0, 0 0
ii ii i











is, the marginal cost of socializing a child is positive and increasing. It is further assumed 
that   
ii
t d   and   
ii
t d   are continuous functions.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Spolaore (1997). Within the framework of manufacturing, see Krugman (1991) on the choice of location of 
firms. 
 
14 See for example Becker and Lewis (1973) and Becker and Barro (1988).   12
Note that we are assuming that the parent's socialization costs are linear with respect to 
the number of children, i.e., there are no returns to scale within a family. The cost of 
socializing  n children is therefore   
ii
tt nd  . It could be claimed that within a family, 
socialization has the nature of a public good since messages and values are delivered to 
the family as a whole. However, on the other hand, there is what we may call a 'rotten 
kid' effect. If despite the socialization process one child switches to the other trait, he may 
become the 'rotten apple' in the family's barrel. It is therefore supposed that negative and 
positive externalities of the socialization processes net out each other and as a result there 
are no returns to scale.  
 
Furthermore, we assume that the cost of rearing children and the cost of socialization are 
separable and additive, hence the total cost of rearing children and socializing them is 
 
ii i ii
tt t nn d  
 15.  Individuals of trait iderive utility from consumption at time t, 
i
t c  
whose unit price is set equal to 1.  The utility function of a representative parent who 
lives at time t and belongs to type i, is given by:  
 
(2)                                       ,
iii i ii i i i
ttt t t t t und k fn n E V c   . 
 
Each household is endowed with the same initial wealth W , hence the budget constraint 
facing individual iof trait t is: 
 
(3)        
ii i ii i
tt tt nn dc W     . 
 
Each parent maximizes her utility subject to the budget constraint by choosing the 
number of children,
i
t n , and the socialization effort per child, 
i
t d .    The first order 
conditions are given by: 
 
                                                 
15 With this assumption we follow other scholars, see for example Galor and Moav (2002) and Galor and 
Weil (2000).  13
(4)        0
i
ii i i i i ii t
tt t t i
t
u
kfn E V n d
n

         
 
(5)                         10
t
i







       
 . 
 
From equations (4) and (5) we obtain the optimal number of offspring and the optimal  
socialization effort per child, for an individual of type iat time t: 
 
(6)     ,, ,,  ,, ,
tt
i i ii ij i i i i ii ij i i
tt t t n nVVqk d dVVqk 
16  . 
 
In the following propositions we will verify that the model predicts that: when some 
degree of heterogeneity exists within the population, a parent prefers to have children and 
directly socializes them to her own values. 
 
Proposition 1:     01    0 , 1
ii i
tt t dq q    . 
 
Proof:  From equation (5) we get that    00 1
i
t d    and    10
i
t d  . As    0
ii
t d    , 
and by the continuity of    
ii
tt dq    for    0,1
i
t q  the proposition is proven. Equation (5) 
indicates that the socialization effort per child is not related to the number of offspring, 
due to our earlier assumption on the linearity of socialization costs with respect to the 
number of children.  Equation (5) also indicates that in the extreme case where  1
i
t q  , the 
parent does not make any direct socialization effort since the probability that an 
offspring's type will be other than the parent's is zero. However, when 
i
t q <1 a parent 
directly socializes her offspring since she prefers offspring who inherent her own trait.  
 
From equation (4) we obtain that a parent always prefers a positive number of offspring.  
Formally:  
                                                 
16  See appendix A for derivation of the second order conditions for maximization.  14
Proposition 2:    ,, , 0
t
ii i i i j i i
tt nn V V q k    for every    0,1
t
i q  . 
 
Proof: From proposition 1 we have concluded that     
iii
tt dq  , as well as 
i
t EV   , are 
finite for    0,1
i
t q  .  By the assumptions on   
ii
t n   and   
ii
t f n  we conclude that a 
parent always chooses a positive number of children. 
 
The solution to the parent's 'direct socialization effort' is given solely by equation (5). 
Given that solution, equation (4) shows that a parent derives positive and finite expected 
utility from her offspring's trait and bears finite and positive costs from directly 
socializing the offspring and rearing them. Nevertheless, her marginal utility from rearing 
children, when she has none, is infinite; therefore she always prefers to have offspring.  
 
3.1 Comparative statics  
This sub-section examines how the optimal levels of the two decision variables (
i
t n  and 
i
t d ) are affected by changes in the exogenous variables of the model (
i
t q and 
i k ).  
 
3.1.1  A change in 
i
t q : 
Fully differentiating the first order conditions with respect to 
i
t q , leads to the following:  
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t un , d   .
17 By Cramer's Law we obtain: 
 
                                                 
17 See also appendix A.  15
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From equations (1) and (4) we see that the marginal benefit from an additional offspring 
increases as the expected value of the trait rises, while the marginal cost remains 
constant. Therefore the number of offspring of a parent of type i increases with the share 
of her trait among the general population
18. From equation (5) we see that the marginal 
benefit from directly socializing offspring to trait i is decreasing with the share of the 
trait among the general population, as the expected trait value increases due to oblique 
socialization. It follows that the direct socialization effort to trait i is decreasing with the 
share of the trait among the general population. 
 
3.1.2  A change in 
i k  
The 'taste for children' effect is obtained by fully differentiating the first order conditions 
with respect to
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By applying Cramer's Law to equation (10) we obtain:  
                                                 
18 This result also leads to the prediction that ethnic/religious minorities will have fewer children in the host 
country than in their country of origin. This prediction is in line with the 'minority-group-status' hypothesis 
suggested by Sociologists (e.g. Knodel, 1974) who argued that minority groups who had high fertility rates 
in their countries of origin tend to adopt local practices of reducing family size. An often cited example 
relates to Jews in the US who have birth rates that are even lower than the US average. On the other hand, 
Mormons in the US have high birth rates (much higher than the country average; Heaton, 1986 and Lehrer, 
1996), most probably because they live in closed and isolated communities and therefore enjoy a very high 
q.  16





















From equation (11) and (12) we see that an increase in 
i k  has a positive effect on the 
number of children but nevertheless does not have any effect on the direct socialization 
effort.  
 
3.2   The evolutionary dynamics of secularization 
The main goal of this study is to present and explain the evolution of secularization 
(increase in the share of seculars, or the probability to become secular).  This sub-section 
looks at the dynamics of the secularization process that evolves from the model.  To gain 
more insight into this process, several simulations are performed in order to uncover the 
effects of the various model's variables on secularization. These simulations lead to 
testable hypotheses, tested using data from a battery of countries. 
The ratio of ‘seculars’ at time 1 t  , 
1 t
s q
  is defined by: 
 
(13)            
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 is the share of 
secular among the general population at time t, 
i
t n  is the number of children a parent 










is the ratio of children of secular parents within the total 
number of children at time t. By proposition 2    0   01
s
tt vq ,   . From equation (13)  17
we calculate the change in the share of seculars within the total population, from one 
period to the next one:
19 
 


















  . 
Equation (14) can be used to prove the existence of at least one locally stable steady-
state: 
 
Proposition 3: There exists at least one locally stable stationary state 
* s qw h e r e  
* 01
s q  . 




  , thus  1
t
s q   and  0
t
s q   are 
steady states. From equation (5) we see that  0   0 1
ii
tt dq    and  0
i
t d   for  1
i
t q  .  By 
differentiating equation (14) with respect to 
s
t q  we arrive at: 
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From equations (15) and (16) we conclude that  1
t
s q   and  0
t
s q   are unstable steady 
states. Continuity of the map from 
t




 presented by equation (14) implies the 
existence of at least one interior stationary solution which is locally stable
 20. 
 
                                                 
19 We use continuous time approximation to calculate the dynamics of secularization (see also Bisin and 
Verdier, 2001a). 
20 See also Bisin and Verdier (2001a).  18
4   Simulations and derivation of corollaries 
To simulate equation (14) we choose functional forms in accordance with the model's 
assumptions. In particular, we assume that the utility derived from rearing offspring is: 

ii i i i
tt f nk A n  ; the cost of rearing offspring is:  








Bn i f n

    
  
; and the cost 
of direct socialization is:  

2
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.  The form of the cost function 
that is associated with direct socialization effort,   
ii
t d  , is borrowed from Einstein's 
relativity theory and it indicates that the cost of direct socialization is increasing and 
convex and converges to infinity as 
i
t d  approaches unity. The utility function is therefore: 
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where:    , ir s   and  1
s k  (a numeraire).  The first order conditions with respect to 
i
t n  
and 
i
t d   are: 
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In the following section we simulate equation (14) to obtain the dynamics of 
secularization (that is measured by the change in the share of the secular population), for 
different parameter values. Simulations are helpful for better understanding the 
secularization process that is presented in the theoretical model, and in particular, where 
the theory does not provide clear-cut results.  
We prefer to present a case of multiple steady-states since it demonstrates both intuitive 
but also less intuitive possible theoretical outcomes. The question which type of steady- 19
state better reflects real world situations is an empirical one and will be clarified in 
section 5. The values of the parameters in the simulations were chosen to produce 
multiple steady-states and are not based on real world data. Obviously, they reflect the set  
of our assumptions.  We start with: 
1)  The base case: 
   0.9,  0.9,  4.3,  4.5,  1.5,  2,  4











Here we have two stable equilibrium points, one at  0.13
s q  and another at  0.78
s q  . 
Notice that  0.6
s q   is an unstable equilibrium point, above which the share of the 
secular population increases over time and converges to  0.78
s q  , and below which the 
share of the secular population decreases over time and converges to  0.13
s q 
22. The  
first simulation leads to the first corollary: 
 
Corollary 1: Secularization in period 1 has a parabolic relation with secularization in 
period 0 around the stable steady-state. Up to some level, an increase in secularization in 
period 0 increases secularization in period 1, and then, a negative relation between 
secularization in periods 0 and 1 is envisioned.   
 
                                                 
21 Note that we assume that the transmission of religious values is more costly than the transmission of 
secular values. For instance, religious schools are usually more expensive than regular public schools and 
in many countries they are private and charge high tuition fees. Another example, dietary restrictions of 
food consumption in the Jewish and Moslem religions are costly. See also Iannaccone (1998).    
22 Although the existence of a unique stable steady-state is possible, we preferred to use the multiple 
equilibriums case for comparative statics, since it better demonstrates all possible outcomes.   20
This simulation provides insights into the secularization process that can not be gained 
explicitly from the theoretical model: The theory allows for both a positive and a negative 
relationship between the shares of a type i sub-population  ir , s  in two subsequent 
periods. It follows from equations (8) and (9) (and also from equations (18)-(19)) that as 
the share of type i sub-population  ir , s  within the general population is increasing, it 
becomes more fertile. But on the other hand, it also invests less in direct socialization 
(counting more on oblique socialization
i q ) leading to the result of the ambiguous 
relation stated in corollary 1.  
 
2)  A decrease in the religious 'taste for children'  
r k :  
Next we will verify the effect that an exogenous decrease in the religious 'taste for 
children' has on secularization. A decrease in the religious 'taste for children' could stem, 
for example, from an increase in religious women's general education that leads to a 
higher cost of time and to an increase in labor force participation of religious women
 23. 
 
0.9, 0.9,  4.3,  4.5,  1.1,  2,  4










As a result, the share of seculars among the general population increases in the two stable 
steady-states: from  0.13
s q   to  0.19
s q   and from  0.78
s q   to  0.82
s q  . We can 
conclude with the following corollary:  
                                                 
23 See for example Becker (1960), Becker and Lewis (1973), Becker and Tomes (1976), Becker and Barro 
(1988),  Hanushek  (1992), and Ermisch  (2003).  21
Corollary 2: A decrease in the religious 'taste for children' leads to an increase in 
secularization. 
 
This result also stems from the theoretical model: From equations (4) and (18) we see 
that a decrease in the religious taste for children results in a decline in fertility within the 
religious sub-population (for every 
s q ), while leaving the socialization effort per child 
unchanged. The decline in the fertility rate among the religious, accompanied by an 
unchanged socialization effort, implies an increase in secularization.  
 
3)  An increase in the religious direct socialization cost  
r C : 
Next we will examine the effect of an increase in the religious direct socialization cost on 
secularization. A increase in the religious direct socialization cost can be (for instance) 
the result of a decline in the state's support to the religious education system, or a 
decrease in donations to religious institutes. In those cases the extra financial burden of 
socializing to religious values falls on the parents and thus increases the socialization 
costs. To verify the effect of cultural transmission of religious values (that is affected by 
the cost of transmission), we analyze the effect of an increase in the socialization cost 
within the religious group only  
r C  while leaving the secular's socialization cost  
s C  
unchanged. 
                0.9,  0.9,  4.3,  4.6, 1.5,  2,  4









The above simulation indicates that the secular share within the general population 
decreased from  0.13
s q   to  0.11
s q   in the lower steady-state, and increased from  22
0.78
s q   to  0.83
s q   in the higher steady-state. Thus, the following corollary can be 
formulated: 
Corollary 3: An increase in the religious direct socialization costs leads to a lower level 
of secularization for sufficiently small secular sub-populations, and to an increase in 
secularization for sufficiently large secular sub- populations.  
 
The theoretical model leads to ambiguous results for the effect of an increase in religious 
socialization costs on secularization: From equations (5) and (19) we see that an increase 
in the religious direct socialization cost leads to a decrease in the religious direct 
socialization effort. However, equations (4) and (18) indicate that the effect on fertility 
within the religious sub-group is ambiguous: while the marginal utility from an additional 
offspring decreases, it is not clear what happens to the marginal cost (it could increase or 
decrease). The simulation reveals that fertility within the religious sub-group increases 
when the share of religious among the general population is large enough, and decreases 
for sufficiently small religious sub-populations. 
 
4)   The next simulation looks at the interaction between the effects of an increase in the 
religious socialization costs  
r C  and a decrease in the religious 'taste for children' 
r k : 
Whether the effect that an increase of the religious socialization costs has on 
secularization is intensified or diminished by an exogenous increase in the share of 
seculars, caused by a decrease in the religious taste for children: 
0.9, 0.9,  4.3,  4.6, 1.1,  2,  4









The simulation reveals that the lower steady-state increased from  0.11
s q  (in the  
previous simulation) to  0.16
s q  , and the higher steady-state further increased from 
0.83
s q   to  0.86
s q  . This leads to: 
 
Corollary 4: a decrease in the religious taste for children increases the positive effect of 
the increase in the religious direct socialization costs which occurs for a sufficiently 
large share of seculars among the general population, while diminishing the negative 
effect on secularization which occurs for a sufficiently small secular share within the 
general population. 
 
The intuition behind this result in straightforward: An exogenous decrease in the 
parameter of religious 'taste for children' leads to a decrease in fertility among the 
religious population for every 
s q  (see equations (4) and (18)).  As a result, the increase in 
secularization in the higher steady-state, caused by an increase in the religious direct 
socialization cost, is intensified (that is, direct religious socialization effort, 
r d , and 
oblique religious socialization, 
r q , are complementary production factors in the 
production of next period's religiosity) while the decrease in secularization in the lower 
steady-state is diluted (that is, direct religious socialization effort, 
r d , and oblique 
religious socialization, 
r q , are substitute production factors in the production of next 
period's religiosity). 
 
5   The data base, variables and econometric analysis 
5.1 Data - The ISSP (1998) description and variables' definition 
The data used for the empirical analysis were drawn from the module on National 
Identity of the 1998 International Social Survey Program (ISSP): Religion II. The ISSP is 
an ongoing effort devoted to cross-country research on national attitudes. It includes 
questions on attitudes, beliefs and opinions on various issues, as well as numerous 
questions regarding the individual’s socio-economic and religious background, together 
with information on parents and spouses. Individuals were sampled within the following 
32 countries: Australia, East Germany, West Germany, Great Britain, Northern Ireland,  24
The United States, Austria, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
The Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland, Bulgaria, Russia, New Zealand, Canada, The 
Philippines, Israel, Japan, Spain, Latvia, The Slovak Republic, France, Cyprus, Portugal, 
Chile, Denmark and Switzerland. Most of these countries are predominantly Christian 
(Catholic - 45% of the sample; Protestant – 17.3%; Orthodox – 6.9%); a small share of 
respondents are Jewish (3.7%) or Moslems (1.1%); about 7.8% were raised in other 
religions (e.g. Sikh, Buddhist, Hindu, Shinto, and other Christian denominations); and 
18.1% identify themselves as having ‘no religion’. The data cover the European and 
Australian continents and North America. The African continent is excluded and South 
America and Asia are represented by a small number of countries (Chile, Israel, Japan 
and the Philippines). The research is therefore pertaining to Europe and North-America, 
and a few other countries. The more homogeneous European sample is also analyzed 
separately. The samples were also decomposed by gender, to reveal differences between 
men and women. 
 
This study relates to the evolutionary process of secularization. While there are numerous 
definitions for ‘secularization’ (see Tschannen, 1991; and Swatos and Christiano, 1999, 
for reviews. See also footnote 3), the principal thrust in secularization theory has been the 
claim that “in the face of scientific rationality, religion’s influence on all aspects of life - 
from personal habits to social institutions – is in dramatic decline” (Swatos and 
Christiano, 1999: 214). In this paper we look at religious personal habits and use the 
frequency of attendance of church services as a proxy of religiousness of the two 
generations, of the parents and their off-spring. For the current generation (the 
respondents) there is also information on their prayer habits. 
 
The measure of secularization of the current generation ( 1
s q ) is based on the responses to 
the question: "How often do you attend religious services at a church?" that has the 
following 6 options: never (1); once a year (2); two or three times a year times a year (3);  25
once a month (4); two or three times a month (5); and, at least once a week (6)
24. The term 
'church' is used as a generic term that relates to the relevant religious place of worship 
(e.g., also synagogue for Jews, mosque for Moslems, etc.).  A respondent was categorized 
as ‘secular’ if she/he rarely attends church services i.e., if she/he marked the original 
categories of (1), (2) or (3), i.e., attending religious services no more than three times a 
year
25. 
The ISSP questionnaire has also a question on private prayer habits: “How often do you 
pray?” The possible answers are: never (1); once a year (2);  twice a year (3); few times a 
year (4); about once a month (5); two or three times a month (6); almost every week (7); 
every week (8); several times a week  (9); once a day (10); and several times a day (11). 
Respondents who chose one of the first three categories (rarely prays: prays no more than 
twice a year) were defined as ‘secular. This is an alternative categorization of seculars 
and the two measures of 'secular' are highly correlated. The ISSP provides information on 
church attendance of the respondent’s father and mother, as well as his own participation 
at church activities at the age of 12, by asking: "When you were a child, how often did 
your mother/father/yourself (at age 12) attend religious services?" The options are: never 
(1); once a year (2); one or two times a year (3); several times a year (4); once a month (5); 
two or three times a month (6), almost every week (7); every week (8); several times a 
week (9).  
 
These valuable retrospective data were used to define measures of ’religious’ for the 
father/mother/child at 12. The father/mother/child was ‘religious’ if she/he attended 
services almost every week or more often (intensive church attendance: original 
                                                 
24 The questionnaires that were distributed in Israel and in Bulgaria included 9 categories, to reflect the 
somewhat different rules of congregation in Judaism and within the Christian Orthodox religion. We were 
able to combine categories and bring the 9 categories of the Israeli/Bulgarian questionnaires down to the 6 
categories of the general questionnaires. 
25 As one of the referees mentioned, the same frequency of church attendance (e.g. once a month), could 
mean religious commitment in one country and secularization in another country. In other words, the 
dependent variable could be country specific. To control for country differences, we added as an 
explanatory/control variable the average level of church attendance in the respondent's country. The basic 
results did not change.  26
categories of (7), (8) or (9))
26. As we do not relate to a numerical variable and combine 
three categories, we minimize measurement errors that result from the retrospective 
nature of the data. There are no retrospective questions on prayer habits. 
 
The ISSP (1991 and 1998) appear to be the only multi-nation surveys to ask retrospective  
church attendance questions
27. While retrospective data are frequently questioned for 
their reliability, there is no reason to presume that people have special difficulty recalling 
their religious backgrounds. Childhood attendance is a distinctive and well-defined 
activity, not easily confused with other activities, nor easily forgotten altogether. 
Individual rates of attendance tend not to vary much over time, thus limiting problems 
associated with the misdating of memories. People rarely confuse their childhood and 
adult experiences, and childhood is the only period when most people routinely observe 
their parents’ religious activities. Iannaccone (2003) assessed the reliability of the ISSP 
retrospective attendance data by comparing them to the GSS American data, the 
American Catholic Surveys conducted in 1963 and 1974 by NORC, and additional 
evidence from surveys conducted in Canada the US and Europe. He reached the 
conclusion that the ISSP data “stand up to numerous different tests of internal and 
external consistency” (page 34)
28.  
 
5.2 Regression analysis: Logistic ‘secularization equations' 
5.2.1 Variables and testing of corollaries  
To better understand the secularization process and gain more insight into the link 
between the model’s parameters and the resulting trend of secularization, regression 
                                                 
26 The religious rules of congregation vary between religions (e.g., many orthodox Jews congregate once or 
even twice a day, while Christians congregate once a week). However, the upper category is 'several times 
a week', and it covers the most observant respondents from all religions. It follows that the dummy variable 
'intensive practice' includes intensive worshippers of all religions. 
27 There is a major American survey, The General Social Surveys (GSS), that included analogous questions 
in 1983-1986, 1988 and 1989 (Davis and Smith, 1998), but they were administrated only in the US. 
28 He even became poetic when he summarized: “Stop making do with scattered historical statistics, and tap 
the comprehensive history we collectively carry in our minds. Stop grinding the same old survey questions 
through ever more complex calculations, and begin mining the global storehouse of retrospective data. Let 
others wait for decades of polls spanning dozens of countries; reconstruct the past now” (page 33).  27
analysis was used for the estimation of the probability to be currently secular,  1
s q , in 
terms of the model. The dependent variable was a dichotomous variable that received the 
value of 1 for a ‘secular’ respondent (defined above) and 0 otherwise
29. Logistic 
regression was used accordingly to arrive at the odd-ratios of the independent variables. 
A significant odds-ratio that is smaller than 1 means that an increase (decrease) in the 
corresponding explanatory variable led to a decrease (increase) in the probability of 
secularization (and accordingly in  1
s q ). Similarly, a significant odds-ratio that was larger 
than 1 means that there was a positive relationship between the corresponding 
explanatory variable and the prospects of secularization: an increase (decrease) in the 
former resulted in an increase (decrease) also in the latter.  
  
The first corollary relates to the relationship between  0
s q  (or  0 1
r q  ), which is the share of 
secular individuals in the respondent's neighbourhood when he was a child,  and  the 
dependent variable ( 1
s q ).  0
s q  is not known. However, as we have a multi-country sample 
we can instead relate to the diversity of religions in the country of residence. In more 
religiously pluralistic countries, there is a lower tendency that the respondent lived 
among fellows of his religion, and the oblique transmission is therefore supposed to be 
lower. Religious diversity (pluralism) therefore represents a proxy for  0
s q . 
 
The  P index that represents  religious pluralism  (diversity), was defined as  P=1-HHI, 







                                                 
29  The dependent variable was defined as a dummy variable that reflects the topic of this study which is 
secularization. We also experimented with an alternative secularization dependent variable that relates to a 
very low frequency of prayer. The results were similar in terms of sign and significance. Using current 
mass attendance is also more consistent with the use of parental and childhood mass attendance (there is no 
information on parental and childhood prayer habits). 
Moreover, by using the richer information on mass attendance (6 levels) and prayer (11 levels) and 
estimating an equation of religiosity (using Ordered Logit), we also arrived at results that are in line with 
the model predictions. In order to save space and as our direct topic is secularization (and not degree of 
religiosity) we prefer to present the Logit equations of secularization (dichotomous variable) and in terms 
of attendance of church services.  28
the sum of squares of the shares of the country’s religious denominations
30. It follows 
that P ranges between 0 (if everyone belongs to the same religion) and (almost) 1 (if there 
are a large number of religions, each of which covers a negligible fraction of the 
population). The larger P is, the more religiously diverse the country is said to be (see 
also Lieberson, 1969). 
 
The model relates to  0
s q  (P) when the respondent was a child, while we are using P for 
1998. However, religious diversity of countries does not change significantly over time 
and it can be assumed that the current level of religious pluralism is very similar to the 
respective level a few decades ago when the respondent was a child. It follows from 
Corollary 1 that a non-linear parabolic relationship between P and secularization with a 
maximum point is expected.
 We therefore arrive at: 
Hypothesis 1: Religious diversity has a non-linear parabolic effect on secularization. Up 
to some diversity level, secularization rises when diversity increases and then a negative 
relationship is expected. 
 
As has been noted in the literature review in section 2, the literature includes two 
opposing theories on the relationship between religious diversity and secularization. 
While sociologists who advocated demand-side views claimed that more diversity leads 
to higher prospects of secularization, economists who believe in supply-side theories 
claimed the very opposite. The theoretical model does not lead to a clear-cut conclusion; 
however, the simulation-based Corollary 1 expected an inverted U shaped relationship 
between pluralism and secularization, indicating that up to some level of religious 
diversity demand-side forces are the more dominant, whereas after this point supply-side 
forces take the lead. It appears that this prediction is innovative and has not yet been 
suggested in the literature. 
                                                 
30 The HHI is borrowed from the analysis of industries, where  i s  is the market share of firm i , in a given 
industry. HHI serves as a measure of the competitiveness of an industry. In an industry with a single   
monopolistic producer, HHI will equal 1. If the industry is composed of n  firms of equal size, then HHI = 
1/n , and as the number of firms is increasing HHI, is approaching 0.   29
Corollary 3 relates to the effect of an increase in the cost of religious cultural 
transmission 
r C  on the secularization of the children's generation (see section 4). The 
ISSP does not have any information on these costs. However the rich ISSP data base 
facilitates an indirect test of Corollary 3. 
 
In order to test Corollary 3 we use two assumptions: (i) religious cultural transmission is 
accomplished by taking children to the church on a regular basis, as well as by having a 
religiously homogamous household and by parental frequent attendance of church 
services (that signals the importance of religious norms and behavior); (ii) the standard 
assumption of a negative relationship between price and quantity (everything else being 
equal) holds, and intensified religious behavior is a result of lower costs. It follows that 
more intensive church attendance reflects lower costs (lower 
r C ). Another assumption is 
that as the share of seculars in the countries of our sample is relatively large, we are the 
upper steady-state. 
 
  Parental religious socialization effort   0
r d , that is negatively related to the cost of 
parental cultural religious transmission  
r C  is proxied using four complimentary 
variables: (a) a ‘religious’ mother; (b) a ‘religious’ father; (c) a ‘religious’ child at the 
age of 12; and (d) a religiously homogamous family, where the two parents had the same 
religion. 
The following retrospective variables have been defined: 
  Religious (intensively practicing) mother=1; if the mother attended church 
services almost every week, every week or several times a week (categories (7); 
(8); or (9)). 
  Religious (intensively practicing) father=1; if the father attended church services 
almost every week, every week or several times a week (same three categories).  
  Religious (intensively practicing)  child=1; if the respondent, when he was 12 
years old, attended church services almost every week, every week or several 
times a week (same three categories).  30
  The two parents had the same religion=1; if the mother and the father had the 
same religious denomination (when the respondent was a child). 
Corollary 3 predicts that a decrease in the religious direct socialization effort (caused by 
an increase in direct socialization costs) results in a higher secular share in the next 
period    1
s q . This relationship is quite obvious: children who were exposed to intensive 
religious practice have a higher tendency to follow religious behaviour when they grow 
up. Moreover, a natural assumption is that more religious parents (who cherish the 
religious rules and norms) invest more in the children's religious capital, using their time 
and financial resources. Religious transmission is more efficient if the two parents had 
the same religious affiliation. If the founding couple did not share the same religion, they 
were less likely to pass on a religious legacy due to disagreement about religious rules. 
Additionally, if the mother and father had different religious denominations, affiliation 
with the religion of one of the parents could lead to conflict with the other one, thus 
leading to the abandonment of religious practice altogether.   
The next hypotheses therefore follow: 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a negative relationship between having a mother who intensively 
practiced (was ‘religious’) during the respondent’s childhood (first generation), and 
secularization later on in life (second generation); 
 
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative relationship between having a father who intensively 
practiced (was ‘religious’) during the respondent’s childhood (first generation), and 
secularization later on in life (second generation); 
 
Hypothesis 4: There is a negative relationship between intensively practicing at the age 
of 12 (effort exerted by parents – first generation – who took the child to church), and 
secularization later on in life (second generation); 
The three alternative estimates of the effect that intensity of church attendance (of the 
mother, the father and the child) has on secularization will enable comparing the  31
magnitudes of the influence of the mother, the father and the child's own religious 
childhood experience.  
Hypothesis 5: The probability of secularization is lower if both parents had the same 
religious affiliation. 
 
Corollary 4 relates to the effect of interactions between  0
r d  and  0
s q    0 1
r q    on 
secularization ( 1
s q ). It suggests that the effect of a decrease in the religious direct 
socialization effort,  0
r d , (caused by an increase in the religious direct socialization costs 
(
r C )) for relatively large shares of seculars is intensified by an increase in the share of 
seculars among the general population,  0
s q  (caused by a decrease in the religious taste for 
children 
r k ). In other words, the interaction term  00 *
rs dq  in the secularization equation 
is positive. 
  
As suggested above, the diversity index P is a proxy for  0
s q , while a religious 
mother/father/child and a religiously homogamous household are proxies for  0
r d . The 
cross effects of Corollary 4 can therefore be tested by using the following interaction 
variables: (P*religious mother); (P*religious father); (P*religious child at 12); and 
(P*religiously homogamous household). 
 
We therefore arrive at: 
Hypotheses 6-9: The cross-effects of P and a religious mother; a religious father; a 
religious child at the age of 12; and a religiously homogamous parental household are all 
positive. 
 
In order to arrive at net effects of our core variables on secularization, several socio-
demographic characteristics have also been included as explanatory variables. These   32
include: 
- Age: Age embodies cohort effects: secularization was not common decades ago and has 
increased during recent years. It follows that older people belong to a cohort when 
secularization was less common and therefore have a lower tendency to become secular. 
‘Age’ was represented by a set of dummy variables (60 and over; 46-59; 31-45; with 30 
and below as the reference group), to allow for a non-linear effect of age. 
- Education: There is ambiguity regarding the effect of education on church attendance. 
There are two opposing channels that relate education with churchgoing: (1) the first 
points to a negative relation because more educated people tend to be more rational and 
less spiritual. Moreover, education decreases belief in the returns of religious activity, 
thereby reducing the incentives to participate in these activities; (2) an opposing channel 
leads to a positive relationship between education and church attendance via a social 
networking effect: religious activity is a major form of social interaction (Durkheim, 
1995). Social group membership almost universally rises with education
31 and the church 
is simply another form of a social group. The benefits stem from networking effects that 
could even lead to improvements in the worshipper's financial and professional prospects. 
The two conflicting effects could lead to a (combined) positive or negative correlation 
between education and churchgoing, or to an insignificant correlation. Education was 
defined by dummy variables that relate to the last school attended by the respondent 
(academic; high school; with elementary school as the reference group) 
-  Marital status variables: that included: marital status (=1 if married); number of people 
in household; and (married*spouse has ‘no religion’). There is no consensus in the 
economics literature on the correlation between marital status and religious practice, or 
number of children and the intensity of religious practice (see Brañas-Garza and Neuman, 
2004, for a more detailed discussion). Obviously, if the respondent is married to a spouse 
who identifies himself as having ‘no religion’, it increases his prospects to be secular. 
- Country specific variable: per-capita GDP, (and the index of religious pluralism P, 
described above): This variable was included to control for differences between 
                                                 
31 Sacerdote and Glaeser (2001) report a positive connection between schooling and social group 
membership in almost all the 69 countries they examined.  33
countries
32. Alternatively, Fixed-Effects could have been used. The two country-specific 
variables, namely, P and per-capita GDP were used instead. Moreover, as we are 
interested in the effect of religious pluralism on secularization, this version is preferable 
to Fixed-Effects. In order to control for intra-country correlations between observations 
of respondents from the same country, clustered (by country) standard errors were used. 
We are presenting also the Fixed-Effects version (Table 3) in order to demonstrate that 
the results for the core explanatory variables are similar
33. In Table 3 we are also using 
the alternative proxy for secularization, namely very low frequencies of prayer (no more 
than twice a year=1). The basic results hold for this definition too. 
Estimations were performed separately for the two genders and also repeated for the 
more homogeneous European sub-sample. 
 
5.2.2  Findings 
Sample characteristics: Appendix Table B1 presents the characteristics of the samples 
used for the estimation of the secularization equations. The average characteristics of the 
European sub-sample are similar to those of the larger sample. Pooling the data for the 32 
countries, we found that 44% of the women and 52% of the men were ‘secular’ at the 
time of the survey. The figures were very similar within the European countries (43% and 
53% of women and men, respectively). The percentage of ‘religious’ (intensively 
practicing) mothers is larger than the corresponding figure for the fathers (over 40% and 
30%, respectively). Close to 50% of respondents were 'religious' at the age of 12. The 
lower percentage of women who are currently ‘secular’ and the larger share of ‘religious’ 
mothers (compared to men/fathers) is in line with theories and findings of other studies 
showing that women are generally more religious (Sandomirsky and Wilson, 1990; 
Sherkat, 1991; Beit-Hallahmi, 1997; Loveland, 2003; Brañas-Garza and Neuman, 2004). 
The means of the other socio-economic explanatory variables are similar for the two 
                                                 
32 There is an extensive literature on the relationship between a country's growth level or development level 
(measured by per-capita GDP) and secularization/religiosity (for instance, Chaves, 1989; de-la Croix and 
Michel, 2002; McCleary and Barro, 2006; Franck and Iannaccone, 2009). Proponents of demand-side 
theories suggest that increased economic development leads to decreases in religiosity (increases 
secularization). Our model does not relate to this topic and per-capita GDP is used as a control variable. 
Nevertheless, the empirical results can be related to the ongoing dispute in the literature.   
33 Obviously, as in this version the religious pluralism variables are missing, only hypotheses 2-5 can be 
tested.  34
genders. The countries are not very pluralistic in terms of existing religions within the 
country: An average pluralism index of 0.377 with a Standard-Deviation of 0.243 (0.351 
in Europe, SD=0.238) indicates quite limited diversity. 
 
Secularization equations with country-specific variables (clustered by country standard-
errors, no interacted effects): Table 1 presents results of ‘Secularization Equations’. The 
coefficients are the odds-ratios, except for the figures that relate to the P and P squared 
variables that are the raw coefficients of the Logit regression
34. Odds-ratios that are 
smaller than 1 correspond to negative raw coefficients (of the Logit regression), 
indicating a negative relationship between the explanatory variable under discussion and 
the probability of secularization (an increase in the explanatory variable leads to a 
decrease in the probability of becoming secular, and vice versa). Similarly, an odds-ratio 
that is larger than 1 corresponds to a positive coefficient of the Logit regression, and 
means that the probability of secularization is positively related to the relevant 
explanatory variable. 
 
As is evident from Table 1, diversity of religions in the country of residence (P) has a 
parabolic significant effect on secularization, with a maximum point: The likelihood of 
secularization first rises with the increase in religions pluralism and after it reaches a 
maximum, the trend changes to a decrease in secularization. The peak is around a 
pluralism level of 0.5. It is above the average level that is 0.377 within the larger sample 
and 0.351 in the European countries. Hypothesis 1 (based on Corollary 1) is therefore 
supported by our data. 
 
 
Table 1: Logistic Regressions of Secularization (standard-errors clustered by 
country), ISSP 1998. 
Dependent variable: Respondent Attends religious services no more than three 
times a year. 
                                                 
34 Following the terminology used by the Stata statistical package, we use the term 'Logit' for the estimation 
procedure that maximizes the logarithm of the likelihood function. The coefficient of the Logit regression 
describes the effect of the explanatory variable on the logit (or log-odds) of the dependent variable. Odds-
ratios can then be calculated by calculating e (the natural logarithm) to the power of the coefficient of the 
Logit regression. An alternative way to obtain odds-ratios employs the logistic' command. 'Logistic' fixes 
exactly the same model as 'logit', but its output table displays odds-ratios rather than coefficients 
(Hamilton, 2004: 269).  35
  Explanatory variables  WHOLE SAMPLE  EUROPE 
 Female  Male  Female  Male 
Exposure to religiosity during childhood         




























Religiously homogamous parents 



























































30 and under ref.  ref. ref. ref. 
Education (last school attended) 
















Elementary school ref.  ref. ref. ref. 
Country - specific characteristics        
 





























Sample size 14,955  12,372  12,382  9,936 
Pseudo R
2 0.166 0.161  0.184  0.189 
Notes: 1. Stata 10 was used for estimation of Logistic regressions, with clustered (by country) standard                  
errors, to account for repeated observations from each country. 
            2.  p-values (significance levels) in parentheses.  
         3. The table presents odds-ratios for all explanatory variables, except for the Pluralism-Index where 
the figures relate to the raw coefficients of the Logit regression   36
As expected, exposure to religious practice during childhood significantly reduces the 
likelihood of becoming secular later on in life (odds-ratios smaller than one). The effects 
of the various aspects of exposure (maternal/paternal/own intensive religious practice) are 
not dramatically different. They are also not very different for the two genders or 
between the larger sample and the European sub-sample. A religiously homogamous 
family also has a significant negative effect on secularization. These findings support 
Hypotheses 2-5 (based on Corollary 3). 
 
It should be noted that the significant correlation between parental/childhood church 
attendance and current church attendance maybe due to the existence of 'unobservable 
heterogeneity' at the family level, that results in spurious correlation rather than reflecting 
a causal effect. It, in turn, means that parental/childhood church attendance variables are 
endogenous variables in the equation that intends to explain the secularization of their 
children.    Unfortunately, the ISSP does not include data for an instrument that will 
eliminate this potential statistical problem. However, we believe that the 'religiously 
homogamous' variable can be the kind of 'left out' variable that could give rise to the 
endogeneity. When this variable is included, the endogeneity problem may be eliminated. 
Another probable solution could be the use of an alternative dependent variable for 
secularization, namely 'rare prayer habits' (see Table 3). While parental and respondents' 
church attendance maybe driven by the same family culture (e.g., belief in the importance 
of networking and social ties), it is less likely that parental church attendance and 
children's private/intimate prayer are also motivated by the same forces. 
 
The socio-demographic variables served as control variables and were not part of the 
theoretical model. The regression results show that: A spouse who declared that he has 
‘no religion’ is positively correlated with the probability of secularization. Being married 
and having more children diminishes the probability of secularization
35. The effect of age 
is different between the genders. Women have a constant decreasing probability to be 
secular as they age (over the age of 30, which is the reference category). Age is not 
                                                 
35 Obviously, causality could run the opposite way too: respondents who were secular had a lower tendency 
to marry, a larger tendency to marry spouses with ‘no religion’, and had less children. Removing these 
variables from the regressions resulted in very similar regression coefficients.  37
affecting men in the European sample and only men who are above the age of 60 have a 
lower probability in the larger sample. Education does not seem to affect the tendency to 
become secular. Given the results for per-capita GDP, secularization is more common in 
more developed countries. This finding lends some support to proponents of demand-side 
theories. 
 
Interacted effects of country religious pluralism and exposure to religiosity during 
childhood:  In order to examine cross-relationships between the effects of  0
r d  and 
 00 1
rs qq   (on secularization in the next generation,  1
s q ),  we study the interacted 
effects of their respective proxies.  Insignificant interaction terms indicate that the effects 
of the two factors are independent. A negative interaction effect on secularization means 
that religiosity of the mother/father/child/couple (i.e., exposure to religious experiences 
during childhood), is more effective in producing 'religiosity' and ‘against’ secularization 
in countries that are religiously pluralistic (i.e., the effects of  0
r d  and  0
r q  are substitutes in 
the production of 'religiosity). Alternatively, a positive interaction term of the Logit 
secularization equation shows that the negative effect of a religious 
mother/father/child/couple is less effective and partially crowded out in countries that 
have more religious diversity (i.e.,  0
r d  and  0
r q  are complements in the production of 
'religiosity' and their effects reinforce and complement each other). Hypotheses 6-9, 
based on Corollary 4, suggest complementarity between the effects (for relatively large 
shares of seculars) leading to positive interaction effects.  
 
While in OLS regressions, interacted effects of 2 (or more) variables (on the dependent 
variable) are estimated and tested by using interactions (multiplications) of the 2 
variables, it appears that this is not the case when Logit regressions are used. As Norton 
et al. (2004) showed, in Logit regressions the interacted effect is not the coefficient of the 
interaction term and its statistical significance cannot be tested with a simple t-test on the 
coefficient of the interaction term. Moreover, Ai and Norton (2003) claim that even the 
sign of the coefficient of the interaction term does not necessarily show the sign of the 
interacted effect.  38
 
Norton et al. (2004) created the Stata command 'inteff' to calculate the 'correct' interacted  
effects. Tables 2a and 2b present the results for the larger and the European samples and 
for the 2 genders. Only one interaction term can be used, leading to 4 repeated 
regressions for each case (denoted by Model 1-to-Model 4). All other explanatory 
variables that were included in Table 1 have been included in these regressions too (age 
dummies; education dummies; married; number of people in household; and country per-
capita GDP). 
 
The 'inteff' command also provides graphs that portray z-statistics of the interaction effect 
against predicted probabilities of having low practice. Figure 1 presents the z-statistics of 
the interacted effect of a religious father (attended church services intensively) and the P 
index, within the female European sample. To save space we do not present all other 
graphs and they can be provided by the authors upon request.   
 
As is evident from Tables 2a and 2b, the cross-effects of the country's religious diversity 
(P) and exposure to religious practice during childhood are insignificant in some cases, 
indicating independence between the two types of effects (that proxy oblique and direct 
religious socialization, respectively). Complementarity between the two factors in the 
transmission of religious values and practice (a significant positive cross-effect indicating 
that more religious pluralism leads to a decrease in the negative effect of exposure to 
religiosity at childhood, on secularization) is found in the following cases: For women- 
between religious pluralism and father's religiosity (in the European sample), between 
pluralism and intensive church attendance at 12 (both in the larger sample and in the 
European sample) and between pluralism and a religiously homogamous household  (in 
the European sample). For men-between religious pluralism and a religious homogamous 
household in both samples. 
 
Hypotheses 6-9 are therefore partly supported. Our data does not indicate a significant 
positive interacted effect between a religious mother and P (Hypothesis 6), but we do find  39
significant positive interacted effects of P and other dimensions of exposure to religiosity 
during childhood (Hypotheses 7-9). 
 
 
Table 2a: Logistic Regressions of Secularization (standard-errors clustered by 
country), Whole sample, ISSP 1998.  
Including interacted effects of Country Religious Pluralism with Exposure to 
religiosity during childhood. 
FEMALE   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 








































P*Religious mother  not 
significant 
- - - 
P*Religious father  -   not 
significant 
- - 
P*Religious respondent at 12  -  -   positive 
effect 
- 
P* Religiously homogamous 
parents 
- - -    not 
significant 
Control variables  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Sample size  14,955  14,955  14,955  14,955 
Pseudo R
2 0.165  0.164  0.166  0.164 
        
 
MALE   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 








































P*Religious mother  not 
significant 
- - - 
P*Religious father  -  not 
significant  
- -  40
P*Religious respondent at 12  -  -   not 
significant  
- 
P* Religiously homogamous 
parents 
- - -    positive 
effect 
Control variables  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Sample size  12,372  12,372  12,372  12,372 
Pseudo R
2 0.156  0.156  0.156  0.157 
Table 2b: Logistic Regressions of Secularization (standard-errors clustered by 
country), European sample, ISSP 1998. 
Including interacted effects of Country Religious Pluralism with Exposure to 
religiosity during childhood. 
FEMALE   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 








































P*Religious mother  not 
significant 
- - - 
P*Religious father  -  positive 
effect 
- - 
P*Religious respondent at 12  -  -  positive 
effect 
- 
P* Religiously homogamous 
parents 
- - -  positive 
effect 
Control variables  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Sample  size  12,382 12,382 12,382 12,382 
Pseudo R
2  0.181 0.180 0.182 0.180 
      
MALE   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 








































P*Religious mother  not 
significant 
- - - 
P*Religious father  -  not 
significant 
- -  41
P*Religious respondent at 12  -  -  not 
significant 
- 
P* Religiously homogamous 
parents 
- - -    positive 
effect 
Control  variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample  size  9,936 9,936 9,936 9,936 
Pseudo R
2  0.179 0.179 0.179 0.181 
Notes: 1. Stata 10 (and the 'inteff' command) were used for estimation 
            2. p-values (significance levels) in parentheses.  
        3. The table presents odds-ratios for all explanatory variables. 
        4. All other explanatory variables that were included in the regression reported in Table 1 were 
included in this regression too (age dummies; education dummies; married; number of people in 
household; and country per-capita GDP). 
 
Figure 1: z-statistics of interaction effects of country religious pluralism and 
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As is evident from Figure 1, the interacted effect of religious pluralism and a religious 
father (within the female European sample) is significant and positive. 
 
To gain further insight, Figure 2 presents predicted probabilities of having low practice 
against the religious pluralism index, distinguishing between respondents with a religious 
and non-religious father (using the 'viblicc' command suggested by Mitchell and Chen, 
2005). Figure 2 clearly portrays that the probability of being secular is lower for those 
who grew up with a religious father (supporting Hypothesis 3). Moreover, the probability  42
of secularization increases with the P religious pluralism index only when the respondent 
had a religious father, indicating a positive interacted effect (on secularization) of P and a 
religious father (supporting Hypothesis 7). 
 
Figure 2: A graphical illustration of the interacted effect of country religious 
























































As a whole, these results indicate that in more religiously diverse countries exposure to 
religious practice during childhood is less effective in advancing secularization of the 
children's generation. In other words, religious homogeneity (proxing  0
r q )  and exposure 
to religiosity (proxing  0
r d ) are complements in 'producing' religiosity (i.e. in fighting 




Fixed-Effects secularization regressions: Table 3 presents country Fixed-Effects 
regressions for 2 alternative dependent variables of secularization: (i) the variable used in 
Tables 1 and 2, namely low frequency of mass attendance (no more than few times a 
                                                 
36  Hypotheses 7, 8 and 9 are supported. Hypothesis 6 is not supported but not rejected either – the cross 
effects are insignificant in all sub-samples.  43
year); and (ii) low frequency of prayer: no more than few times a year. Church attendance 
and prayer are 2 dimensions of religiosity. The first relates to a public religious activity, 
while the second is a private/intimate religious activity. It is expected that hypotheses 2-5 
will hold for the 2 dimensions of secularization. The Fixed-Effects regression, that 
includes country dummies/effects, does not allow for country-specific explanatory 
variables and therefore hypotheses 1 and 6-9 can not be tested. Nevertheless, 
confirmation of hypotheses 2-5 within a Fixed-Effects regression model and with the use 
of the 2 secularization definitions will add robustness to our results. 
 
Table 3: Country Fixed-Effects Logistic Secularization Regressions (odds-ratios), 
Whole Sample, ISSP 1998. 
  Explanatory variables       Rare Mass-Attendance   Rare Prayer 
 Female  Male  Female  Male 
Religious exposure during childhood        






























Religiously homogamous parents 



























































30 and under ref. ref.  ref.  ref. 
Education (last school attended) 
 








  Explanatory variables       Rare Mass-Attendance   Rare Prayer 
 Female  Male  Female  Male 








Elementary school ref. ref.  ref.  ref. 
Sample size 14,955  12,372  15,648  13,165 
Pseudo R
2 0.104 0.105  0.144  0.126 
Notes: 1. Stata 10 was used for estimation of country Fixed-Effects Logistic regressions. 
            2. p-values (significance levels) in parentheses. 
                3. To save space we present results for the whole sample only. Results of the European sample are 
not very different and can be provided by the authors upon request.  
 
 
          
As is evident from Table 3, the use of country Fixed-Effects instead of country-specific 
explanatory variables (in Table 1) results in similar odds-ratio estimates and Hypotheses 
2-5 are supported by these regressions too. 
Hypotheses 2-5 are supported also by our 'rare prayer' logistic equations: these 2 aspects 
of secularization ('rare mass-attendance' and 'rare prayer') are similarly affected by 
exposure to religiosity during childhood. The effects of a religious mother/father and a 
religiously homogamous family are very similar. Own church attendance around the age 
of 12 tends to have a stronger negative effect on current prayer habits than on current 
church attendance (for both women and men).    
Age has a stronger negative effect on 'rare prayer' – the probability of 'rare prayer' 
decreases constantly with age, for both women and men. The effect of education is also 
more pronounced: higher education (above elementary school) increases the probability  
of 'rare prayer' for both women and men
37.  
 
6  Summary and concluding remarks 
 
                                                 
37  The effect of academic education on 'rare mass-attendance' is insignificant, most probably, because 
church attendance has also a networking positive effect for highly educated individuals that nets out the 
negative effect that high education is claimed to have on secularization. The networking effect is irrelevant 
for prayer intimate/private habits and therefore we observe a negative effect of high education.   45
In this paper we studied the evolutionary process of secularization. A simple theoretical 
model of cultural transmission and simulations were employed in order to examine the 
effects of oblique and direct religious socialization on the evolution of the secular and 
religious shares within the general population. Estimation of 'Secularization Equations', 
using ISSP (1998) data, indicated that (i) direct religious socialization efforts of one 
generation have a negative effect on secularization within the next generation; (ii) oblique 
socialization by the community has a parabolic effect on secularization; and (iii) the two 
types of socialization are complements in the production of religiosity within the 
children's generation.    
 
The theoretical model assumes that the religious make-up of the community where the 
individual lives is exogenous. In other words, the individual does not choose where to 
live. However, location is in many cases a choice variable. In particular, minority groups 
(e.g. immigrants) prefer to live in communities that share common traits (such as religion, 
religiosity and language) as a buffer against oblique socialization by the majority. The 
relation between location choices, cultural transmission and secularization is a subject yet 
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The second order conditions specify that 
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t d  that were derived from the first order 
conditions (equations (4) and (5)) are maximizing the parent’s utility: 
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Since  11 0 (due to deceasing marginal utility);  22 0    (increasing marginal cost); and 
12 0  (first order condition in (4)), we arrive at:   
2
11 22 12 0       , proving that 
the critical point defined by the first order conditions is indeed maximizing utility. 
   
 
APPENDIX B 
Table B1: Sample Characteristics, ISSP 1998. 
 
  All countries  Europe 
  Female Male  Female  Male 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE        
Secular (low religious practice) (%)  43.6 51.9  43.3  52.6 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES        
Childhood experience (%)        
Religious father (attended church 
services intensively)  33.4 32.9  32.0  31.5 
Religious mother (attended church 
services intensively)  42.0 41.3  42.0  41.3 
Religious respondent at 12 (attended 
church services intensively)  49.1  44.3  49.7  44.3 
Religious homogeneous household 82.4  83.1  83.5  84.1 
Marital Status        
Married (%) 58.8  64.7  57.9  64.4 
Married, spouse has 'no religion' (%)  8.8  7.8  8.6  7.5  53
  All countries  Europe 
  Female Male  Female  Male 
Number of people in house. 3.1 (1.7)  3.2 (1.7)  3.0 (1.6)  3.1 (1.5) 
Age in years (%) 
60 and over  22.9  21.8  24.1  23.0 
46-to-59 21.5 23.3  21.5  22.9 
31-to-45 31.0 30.7  30.5  30.3 
30 and under 24.5 24.2  23.9  23.9 
Education: last school attended (%) 
 Academic 39.2  41.0  37.7  39.3 
High School  39.4  40.7  39.1  41.1 
Elementary school  21.4  18.2  23.2  19.6 
Sample size 14,955  12,372  12,382  9,936 
Distribution of Religion (%) 
Catholic 45.0 48.7 
Jewish 3.7 0.1 
Moslem 1.1 0.7 
Protestant 17.3 19.9 
Orthodox 7.0 8.4 
Others 7.8 3.9 
None 18.1 18.3 
Country Variables 
Per capita GDP 16,078 (11,104)  15,226 (10,705) 
Pluralism Index 0.377 (0.243)  0.351 (0.238) 
 
 Electronic versions of the papers are available at 
http://www.biu.ac.il/soc/ec/wp/working_papers.html 
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